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Abstract
This article aims to explain the gap between IDP law and 
practice in Colombia . Colombia’s IDP legislation is con-
sidered one of the world’s most advanced legal systems as 
it puts in practice the UN Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement . However, the reality of life for IDPs in 
Colombia does not match their legal rights . Especially the 
sections of the law related to preventing displacement and 
providing durable solutions for IDPs are poorly imple-
mented . Following Ferguson’s work on depoliticization, we 
argue that displacement in Colombia is treated as a tech-
nical rather than political problem, detaching it from root 
causes like landownership and structural class inequalities . 
This article provides an overview of the root causes and 
analyzes the different methods through which internal dis-
placement is “depoliticized” in Colombia . In conclusion, 
we will discuss the wider implications of the Colombian 
case for understanding implementation challenges of the 
Guiding Principles .
Résumé
Cet article tente d’expliquer l’écart entre le droit des person-
nes déplacés internes et sa mise en application en Colombie . 
Le droit colombien en matière de déplacement interne 
est considéré comme l’un des systèmes juridiques les plus 
avancés au monde en ce qu’il met en pratique les Principes 
directeurs relatifs au déplacement de personnes à l’inté-
rieur de leur propre pays des Nations Unies . Cependant, 
la réalité des personnes déplacées en Colombie ne corres-
pond pas à leurs droits . En particulier, les sections de la loi 
relatives à la prévention des déplacements et à la mise en 
place de solutions durables pour les déplacés internes sont 
mal mises en œuvre . Suivant les travaux de Ferguson sur 
la dépolitisation, nous soutenons que le déplacement en 
Colombie est considéré comme un problème technique plu-
tôt que politique, le détachant de ses causes premières telles 
la propriété foncière et les inégalités structurelles de classe . 
Nous donnons un aperçu des causes premières du déplace-
ment et analysons les différentes méthodes par lesquelles 
le déplacement interne est « dépolitisé » en Colombie . En 
conclusion, nous discutons des implications plus larges du 
cas colombien pour la compréhension des défis de mise en 
œuvre des Principes directeurs .
Introduction
In this article, we will analyze displacement in Colombia to 
illustrate some of the challenges faced in the implementation 
of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. In 
the case of Colombia, one main concern is that the response 
to internal displacement has effectively depoliticized the 
causes and consequences of the displacement. Forced inter-
nal displacement in Colombia has been going on for dec-
ades, causing millions of Colombians to abandon their 
homes and seek refuge in neighbouring towns or large 
cities.1 Today, Colombia hosts one of the world’s largest 
IDP populations, and the UN has identified the situation 
in the country to be the worst humanitarian crisis in the 
Western hemisphere.2 Yet the phenomenon only received 
attention after the mid-1990s, when the Colombian govern-
ment officially acknowledged their responsibility and first 
steps towards the formulation of IDP rights were taken. The 
framework for IDP-related policies is provided by Law 387, 
which was passed in Congress in 1997. Currently, displace-
ment-related laws in Colombia are heralded as the most 
progressive and comprehensive attempt to implement the 
Guiding Principles.3
Forced displacement in Colombia has commonly been 
explained by the severe and extensive political violence 
involving a number of armed actors, including paramil-
itaries, guerrillas, and the national army. Various guerrilla 
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groups emerged in the 1960s as a reaction to systematic 
oppression and marginalization of the rural and poor popu-
lation throughout centuries, with the most important being 
the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, 
or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN 
(Ejercito de Liberación Nacional, or the National Liberation 
Army). Whereas the first, which is claimed to be the largest 
and best organized guerrilla movement in Latin America 
today, was initiated by peasants, the second was organized 
by students and intellectuals inspired by the Cuban revolu-
tion. Paramilitary organizations emerged as the right-wing 
counter-insurgency, aiming to fight back the guerrillas and 
protect rich landowners and drug lords. Decades of struggle 
by the various armed groups for power and legitimacy have 
included brutal violence and massacres, with severe conse-
quences for civilians. However, as we will illustrate, it is far 
too simplistic to explain forced displacement in Colombia 
as a random side effect of the clashes between armed groups 
without recognizing underlying political causes.  
We argue that responses to displacement in Colombia 
have effectively depoliticized the situation, removing atten-
tion away from these and other political factors. This is done 
through practices that treat the conditions of the displaced 
as problems that require technical rather than structural or 
political solutions. Depoliticizing practices include a focus 
on humanitarian aid rather than prevention of displace-
ment and durable solutions for the displaced, a govern-
mental perspective that only acknowledges certain causes 
for displacement while denying others, and an invisibility 
of the displaced in the public debate on the Colombian con-
flict. In Colombia, many of the internally displaced are not 
recognized as IDPs and the remainder are then reduced to 
recipients of humanitarian assistance and not linked to the 
political conflict in the public debate. This enables an engage-
ment with displacement in Colombia without connecting 
it to its underlying causes. In this article, we will draw on 
theorizing on depolitization as developed by Ferguson and 
Malkki.4
The data on which our argument is based was collected 
during fieldwork in Bogotá, Colombia, from June to August 
2007, supplemented with a review of secondary sources. 
Interviews were conducted with representatives from dis-
placed communities, civil society, and responsible state enti-
ties. A government-organized conference marking the ten 
years of the Colombian IDP law was attended, and partici-
pant observation also took place in IDP registration centres. 
A wide range of legal documents were collected, includ-
ing the Colombian IDP law, the UN Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, and verdicts and rulings from the 
Constitutional Court in Colombia. Furthermore, official 
documents from state entities and reports from NGOs and 
the UN were consulted. After providing a brief background 
to the conflict, the article first describes the discrepancy 
between law and practice in Colombia. The second section 
analyzes the different methods through which internal dis-
placement is “depoliticized” in Colombia. In the conclusion, 
we will summarize our observations from the Colombian 
case in order to look at their implications for the protection 
of internally displaced people elsewhere.
Background to Displacement in Colombia
Latin America is known for its immense gap between social 
classes, as wealth and landownership have been concen-
trated throughout history in most parts of the continent. 
The income distribution was probably the worst in the world 
in the 1960s, and has amplified during the last half of the 
twentieth century, culminating in the neo-liberal era of the 
1980s and 1990s.5 The high concentration of landownership 
which characterizes Latin America has been a catalyst for 
widespread rural violence and one of the main triggers for 
the emergence of insurgency movements.6 Violence in the 
rural areas has been endemic and persistent throughout the 
history of the continent, with the Spanish conquest and col-
onization as one of the most brutal periods. The agrarian 
system which emerged in the colonial and post-colonial per-
iod, where landowners monopolized territories and estab-
lished large landed estates, paved the way for the unbal-
anced and exploitative relationships between land owners 
and tenants.7
In Colombia, the land structure where large haciendas 
turned the peasantry into oppressed wage workers con-
tinued throughout the post-colonial period. The accumula-
tion of land as a source of power and the role of the para-
militaries in protecting the privileges of the landowners 
in Colombian history has been documented in various 
sources.8 During La Violencia in the 1940s and 1950s, mil-
lions of persons were forced to flee their territories, which 
resulted in an increased concentration of land and owner-
ship of agrarian property.9 Up to this day, the depopulation 
of areas is used as a deliberate strategy by the armed groups 
to strengthen their territorial control and to appropriate 
agricultural land. The Colombian Commission of Jurists 
(CCJ) has established that territories that present possibil-
ities for expansion of stockbreeding or extensive extraction 
of minerals and natural resources coincide with high levels 
of forced displacement.10 The displacement has proven to be 
more intense in regions well-suited for agriculture or areas 
rich in minerals.11
The right to land is a fundamental necessity for the lives 
and livelihoods of the rural and often poor sections of society, 
including indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and other groups 
vulnerable to displacement. Displaced indigenous persons 
Volume 26 Refuge Number 1
112
Refuge26-1.indd   112 8/13/10   9:10:20 PM
especially face dramatic consequences of forced displace-
ment from their territories, because of the important bonds 
they have with the earth. Mr. Eugenio Reyes,12 who has been 
displaced from Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta in northern 
Colombia, mentions access to their land, la madre tierra, as 
the main issue that the more than eighty different groups 
of indigenous people are fighting for. According to him, if 
all actors would respect their legal access to a territory, this 
would enable indigenous communities to maintain safe and 
stable livelihoods. The Colombian conflict has a number of 
intertwined causes but the right to land is one of the major 
underlying factors. The situation has been called a “veritable 
guerra de territorio or war for land,”13 and it is clear that 
this war for land has fundamental impacts on displacement 
in Colombia and the government’s efforts of implementing 
the IDP law.
The great majority of the IDPs are campesinos, peasants 
from rural areas, with most often a relatively low degree 
of education and limited sources of income. As most IDPs 
end up in the urban centres, their displacement implies a 
complete change of life and the meeting with a new reality. 
The relationship between the displaced population and the 
urban politicians is characterized by mutual suspicion and 
distrust. The cultural and political differences between the 
intellectual elite in the urban centres and the displaced per-
sons with origin in rural areas are an important obstacle for 
these two spheres of society to understand each other. This 
has deep-rooted historical origins in the institutionaliza-
tion of feudal relationships between the landowning patron 
and poor peon and the systematic oppression of indigenous 
people. This history has great implications for the contem-
porary situation, and adds challenges to the implementation 
of the legal IDP framework.14 
The historian Herbert Tico Braun focuses on the cultural 
relationship between the political and intellectual elites in 
the urban areas and their rural clientele.15 In the 1950s, while 
in most other Latin American countries the state sought to 
incorporate the rural population more thoroughly in the 
nation, the Colombian political elite rather tried to dissociate 
themselves from the campesinos . The fact that large sections 
of the poor rural population never fully obtained their civil 
and political rights further created a sense of humiliation 
and exclusion among this population.16 The gap between 
the rural and urban population contributes to explaining 
the lack of communication between those involved in the 
Colombian IDP situation. Since Law 387 was passed in 
Congress more than ten years ago, the encounters between 
the involved actors have been much more frequent, through 
meetings, hearings in court, and conferences. However, 
in many ways very little has changed, as Rosa Aguilar, a 
Kankuamo woman from la Guarjira, stresses when she 
explains her feelings on the government-organized confer-
ence marking the ten years of the Colombian IDP law:
Today, Law 387 is 10 years old, but for us, the indigenous people of 
Colombia, this is not a celebration. At this conference, we wanted 
to inform the high officers of this country about our situation, 
but they are not even present. That shows a lack of respect for our 
culture and identity as indigenous people, as women, as Africans, 
and especially as those who have lived through the violence in this 
country.17
Rather than being a random side effect, forced displacement 
in Colombia is closely linked to struggles for land owner-
ship, and armed actors use attacks on civilians as a deliber-
ate strategy to seize and control land and to weaken other 
armed groups fighting for the same territory. What compli-
cates the Colombian conflict and violence even more is that 
the government itself must be considered a perpetrator. The 
national army has been involved in attacks causing displace-
ment, and investigations by Colombian control authorities 
and courts have proven close ties between central politicians 
and paramilitary groups. According to the Colombian 
weekly Semana, sixty-eight members of Congress were 
under investigation and thirty-one arrested in the month of 
April 2008 alone.18 Moreover, the political elite and decision 
makers are themselves often powerful land owners, with 
little interest in redistribution of land. In light of these facts, 
it is interesting to study the implementation of the laws that 
have been put in place to protect the displaced.
Mind the Gap: IDP-Related Law and Practice in 
Colombia
Colombia’s legislation on internal displacement was 
developed from 1994, after an announcement by Francis 
Deng, the representative of the UN Secretary-General on 
Internally Displaced Persons. The Colombian government, 
together with a large group of NGOs, had invited Mr. Deng 
to Colombia to meet with various representatives from the 
state and civil society.19 As Walter Kälin, the present UN 
Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, has 
pointed out, “Colombia has a long legal tradition, with a 
history of excellent legal scholarship and institutions dat-
ing from independence.”20 This benefited the development 
of Law 387, which was passed in 1997 and is applauded as 
one of the most progressive and comprehensive legal frame-
works on internal displacement.
The approval of the law gave juridical basis to subse-
quent national action on behalf of internal displacement, 
and the National Plan for Integral Attention of Displaced 
Persons (SNAIPD) now constitutes the institutional frame-
work for IDP protection. In line with the Guiding Principles 
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on Internal Displacement, which were under development 
when Law 387 was passed in Congress, the Colombian dis-
placement legislation addresses all stages of displacement, 
including prevention of displacement; humanitarian assist-
ance during displacement; and the right to return to the 
place of origin or permanently settle elsewhere. It explicitly 
confirms that it is the duty of the Colombian state to “for-
mulate policies and adopt measures for the prevention of 
forced displacement, and for assistance, protection, socio-
economic consolidation and stabilization of persons inter-
nally displaced by violence.”21
The legislation on displacement profited from the new 
Colombian Constitution that was introduced in 1991, which 
makes several references to human rights and creates a num-
ber of valuable mechanisms for the protection of civilians 
in general and the displaced population specifically.22 For 
example, the important petition procedure tutela was intro-
duced and enabled Colombian citizens to denounce viola-
tions of basic rights and receive a decision within ten days. 
The tutela is a “complaint that any citizen can bring before 
any judge in order to seek an immediate judicial injunction 
against actions or omissions of any public authority that they 
claim violates their constitutional fundamental rights.”23 
The use of tutela has increased rapidly during the last decade, 
and the numerous petitions coming from displaced indi-
viduals since 1997 quickly made the Constitutional Court 
acknowledge the existence of a humanitarian crisis.24
In 2004 the Constitutional Court of Colombia concluded 
in ruling T-025 that the current assistance and response 
by the government towards IDPs was unconstitutional, 
ordering the state to promptly address this issue.25 An 
unconstitutional state of affairs describes a de facto situa-
tion, in which by structural causes a large number of cit-
izens—in this case the displaced population—are suffering 
in their daily lives because of recurrent violations of their 
constitutional rights.26 The alleged lack of action by the 
government has further been criticized by a number of 
civil society actors, in addition to the UN Representative on 
Internal Displacement.27 We suggest that prevention of dis-
placement and the right to return or resettle are by far the 
most neglected areas of implementation. In the following 
section, we will provide an overview of the legislation and 
its implementation in the areas of prevention; humanitarian 
assistance; and durable solutions.
Preventing Displacement
According to Law 387, article 2, Colombians have the right 
not to be forcibly displaced. In relation to prevention, the law 
focuses on early communication of potential risk factors that 
may cause displacement, in order for the local and national 
systems to react and supply services before displacement 
occurs. The law furthermore underlines the importance of 
educating the general public on humanitarian law and of 
generating community tolerance, in addition to promot-
ing immediate action from the armed forces on tumults or 
attacks. The government’s responsibilities include the fol-
lowing measures:
1. Stimulate the formation of work groups for prevention and 
anticipation of the risks that may produce displacement, 2. 
Promote community and citizen actions to generate peaceful 
coexistence, and law enforcement activity against agents of dis-
turbance, 3. Develop actions to avoid arbitrariness and discrimin-
ation, and to mitigate the risks to life, personal integrity, and the 
private property of displaced populations, 4. Design and execute 
an International Humanitarian Law Information Plan, and, 5. 
Advise the municipal and departmental authorities responsible 
for the development plans so that they include prevention and 
assistance programs.28
Preventing forced displacement in the midst of an internal 
armed conflict is arguably extremely challenging. The gov-
ernment has never had complete control over the national 
territory, and a number of armed groups are fighting for 
resources and political and social legitimacy in large parts 
of Colombia. An early warning system, Sistema de Alerta 
Temprana (SAT), has been developed by Acción Social29 
and coordinated by the Human Rights Ombudsman, but 
the risk assessment undertaken encompasses only certain 
armed, illegal actors. This undermines the dynamics of the 
ongoing conflict, as displacement is also caused by common 
hostilities and general lawlessness in areas with high crim-
inal activity or as a side effect of activities that are carried 
out by the government to eradicate illicit crops.30
A further severe limitation of the system is that the 
national army is rarely ready to intervene when a warning 
is sent out. This has led potential victims to be reluctant to 
notify the authorities of displacement-related risks, fearing 
reprisals from armed groups.31 In 2006, as an exception 
to the general unwillingness to respond to conflict risks, 
the national army did manage to mobilize and react after 
receiving reports of harassment and possible attacks in the 
Nariño department. However, instead of protecting civil-
ians caught in the middle of the hostilities, soldiers were 
sent to protect areas of military importance such as the Pan-
American Highway.32 This suggests that Colombia’s cur-
rent military strategy does not focus on the protection of 
its civilian population from harassment and armed attacks. 
The fact that the number of displaced persons in Colombia 
is increasing every year is another indication that govern-
mental efforts to prevent displacement are far from being 
implemented in accordance with Law 387.
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Humanitarian Assistance
All displaced persons registered in the official IDP register, 
the Registro Unico de Población Desplazada (RUPD), are 
entitled to emergency assistance. It is further the respon-
sibility of civil and military authorities to ensure the safe 
and free passage of emergency consignments to receiving 
communities. The law states that:
once displacement takes place, the National Government shall 
initiate immediate action to guarantee emergency humanitarian 
assistance with the purpose of relieving, assisting, and protecting 
the displaced population, and attending to its needs in the areas 
of food, personal hygiene, supply management, kitchen utensils, 
psychological and medical assistance, emergency transportation, 
and temporary housing in appropriate conditions.33
Originally, according to the law, the humanitarian aid was 
limited to three months, which in exceptional cases could 
be extended for another three months, depending on the 
conditions and needs of the individuals or households.34 
However, in April 2007, the Constitutional Court declared 
this limitation unconstitutional,35 thus taking an import-
ant step towards ensuring basic needs for IDPs during this 
critical phase before possible resettlement or return.
After the Constitutional Court in 2004 declared that the 
government was far from complying with the IDP law, access 
to humanitarian aid has increased significantly, especially 
in the capital where most IDPs end up. According to offi-
cial statistics, nearly 80 per cent of the displaced population 
have been provided with the three months of basic assist-
ance that they are entitled to.36 A recent report from the 
Monitoring Commission for the Public Policies on Internal 
Displacement (MCPP)37 disputes these high numbers and 
states that only 64 per cent of displaced households regis-
tered in the RUPD received emergency aid in 2006, and only 
57 per cent in 2007.38 Nonetheless, the resources invested 
in humanitarian aid have increased rapidly since 2004, and 
over the last five years the national budget for assistance to 
the displaced has risen from $80 million to $400 million 
annually.39 Particularly in Bogotá and other large cities, sig-
nificant distributions of basic assistance are accomplished 
and the Colombian displaced population has achieved an 
increased access to humanitarian emergency aid from state 
institutions.
Return and Resettlement
Durable solutions for IDPs are crucial to ensure safety and 
the possibility for sustainable livelihoods. The Colombian 
state is responsible for assisting and protecting returnees 
in their reintegration efforts, and if return is not an option 
other permanent solutions need to be made available. Law 
387 specifies that the Colombian Institute for Agrarian 
Reform (Instituto Colombiano para la Reforma Agraria, 
INCORA) should “adopt special procedures and programs 
for the transfer, adjudication, and titling of land in the 
expulsion and reception zones of populations affected by 
forced displacement.”40
The rights that are described here are far from reality for 
the displaced population. Return is problematic due to the 
state’s lack of territorial control in many of the areas where 
displacement occurs.41 Furthermore, there are very few 
resettlement projects and research suggests that hardly any 
of them have proven successful.42
One of the problems that has added to the difficulty of 
securing safe return for IDPs is the increasing number of 
former paramilitaries that are being settled in the areas 
from which people were forced to flee. An important step 
in the governmental plan for demobilization of these so-
called self-defence groups has been to grant impunity to 
most paramilitaries who agree to surrender their weapons 
and provide them with comprehensive assistance for reinte-
gration and resettlement. Former paramilitary soldiers in 
fact are reported to receive far greater support in return 
and resettlement than the displaced population.43 The chal-
lenge of the impunity granted to these individuals leads to a 
reluctance among IDPs to return to their places of origin, as 
the perpetrators of their displacement may be settled in the 
same community.
Similar problems arise in relation to policies linked to 
the resettlement of the internally displaced. In 2004, the 
Colombian government granted an area of 17,000 hectares 
in Carimagua to IDPs. The area was meant to ensure the 
resettlement of approximately eighty families, allowing 
them to start up new lives in relatively safe areas. In February 
2008 the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo revealed that the 
land originally given to IDPs to comply with the national 
IDP law was sold to international companies for the purpose 
of producing African palm for the production of biofuel and 
rubber. According to the Minister of Agriculture, the land 
was not appropriate for small-scale farming.44
A report from the Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre (IDMC) underlines how return to certain areas is 
also blocked because of the production of palm and produ-
cers’ presumed links with paramilitary forces.45 At times, 
the displacement may have been staged in order to enable 
such production in the first place. In 1996, for example, the 
national army led an attack on a guerrilla base in the Chocó 
region, causing massive displacement of the civilian popu-
lation and abandonment of large areas. Soon after, private 
companies cultivating African palm for the production of 
biofuel established businesses in these territories. The gov-
ernment has financially and politically supported initiatives 
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to build such plantations, in order to eradicate illicit drug 
crops and promote regional development.46 It is clear that 
return under these conditions is highly unlikely.
Internal Displacement: A Technical Problem or No 
Problem at All?
From the above, it is clear that the Colombian state is doing 
little in practice to fulfill its legal responsibilities to the dis-
placed population, except to some extent in terms of short-
term humanitarian relief. The effort invested at this stage 
of displacement is unquestionably necessary, but should 
not take place at the cost of far more complex issues like 
preventing displacement and ensuring secure resettlement 
or return. In this section, we will analyze the depoliticiz-
ing effects of treating displacement as a technical problem 
by merely or primarily focusing on humanitarian assist-
ance. Furthermore, we will discuss two related processes 
that similarly disconnect displacement from its political 
and historical context. These processes include, first, the 
Colombian government’s discourse on the armed conflict 
which excludes paramilitaries as potential perpetrators, 
and second, the invisibility of the displaced in the public 
debate.
Since 2004, financial allocations from the government 
have increased steadily, leading to the Colombian dis-
placed population receiving increased humanitarian aid.47 
This is an important step forward in the implementation of 
Law 387. Emergency aid is vital for the displaced, who are 
largely moving from rural backgrounds to urban centres, 
and who are forced to leave their assets behind and have no 
foreseeable opportunity for income-generating activity.48 
Humanitarian assistance is also one of the more concrete 
obligations of the government towards the displaced popu-
lation, which makes it easier to measure and reach tangible 
goals compared to the other rights IDPs have. However, 
there are a number of closely related reasons why a focus 
on the humanitarian aspects of IDP rights can be problem-
atic. First of all, the emphasis on humanitarian assistance 
reduces the Colombian government’s ability to enforce the 
IDP law in the areas of prevention, resettlement, and return, 
as the time and resources that are invested in one area can-
not be invested in the other. Second, the choice of focusing 
on the humanitarian is unfortunate because it is a focus on 
technical, short-term solutions rather than political, long-
term ones. The displaced are helped with this type of assist-
ance in the present, but they are not provided with solutions 
for the future, nor is displacement of others prevented, so 
the problem itself is not addressed in any way.
Thirdly, humanitarian interventions tend to be consti-
tuted as the opposite of political ones,49 portraying the for-
mer to be operating separately from any political or cultural 
context. Relief aid to displaced people purports to be based 
on a moral kind of “doing good” that denies the fact that 
processes of displacement as well as assistance provision are 
always determined by international historical and political-
economic factors.50 The perception of emergency assistance 
as “neutral” and based on a humanitarian imperative dis-
guises all possible political intentions and interests. The aid 
system as an “anti-politics machine” obscures the power-
structured relationships between “givers” and “receivers,” 
by treating the conditions of the displaced as technical 
rather than structural problems that require practical rather 
than political solutions.51 Furthermore, as Malkki argues, 
preventive measures do not come easily in the conventional 
logic of a “humanitarian operation,” as they are conceived 
to be political and thus beyond the realm of the humanitar-
ian.52 This excludes the possibility of focusing on the legal 
obligation to prevent displacement from occurring in the 
first place.
The Discourse on the Conflict
When President Alvaro Uribe took office in 2002, his man-
date was based on an electoral campaign promising a hard-
line policy against the guerrillas. FARC is labelled a terrorist 
group by the Colombian government, which denies them a 
position as political actors.53 By reducing insurgents to “ter-
rorists” and “bandits,” the Uribe administration has been 
able to redefine the contemporary situation. Colombia’s 
High Commissioner for Peace, Luis Carlos Restrepo 
Ramírez, stated in March 2005: “In Colombia there is no 
armed conflict, but rather the threat of terrorism.”54 This has 
been repeated at various occasions throughout the years of 
the Uribe administration. A Colombian lawyer and human 
rights expert suggested, in an interview, that this rhetoric 
was one of the main obstacles for reaching sustainable peace 
and one of the core reasons for the failure to implement the 
comprehensive legal framework on IDPs.55
Ties to the United States have been strengthened since 
Uribe took office, which is reflected in the expansion of Plan 
Colombia—the US-funded assistance package aimed at 
eradicating the production of illicit crops and drug traffick-
ing. In light of the US-led “War on Terror,” the government 
discourse is reducing armed actors to terrorists, stripped of 
any legitimate political objectives. Furthermore, the Uribe 
government claims that, since 2006, the Colombian para-
militaries are completely demobilized and are no longer 
agents of displacement. The government argues that it has 
managed to demobilize approximately 30,000 paramilitar-
ies, and retrieved around 12,000 small arms.56 The discourse 
on the absence of “self-defence groups” such as the paramil-
itaries, in combination with the discourse on the absence 
of war, denies certain groups of displaced people access to 
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their rights and thus complicates the implementation of the 
legal framework. A displaced man in Bogotá explains how 
the assumed non-existence of paramilitary groups could 
affect one’s possibilities to register as displaced and access 
IDP rights:
If you go to denounce your case of displacement, there are some 
conditions. If you say that the ones who displaced you were the 
paramilitaries, they will tell you that they won’t accept your dec-
laration, because the paramilitarism was formally ended one and 
a half year ago. One and a half years ago, the High Commissioner 
of Peace said that the paramilitarism in Colombia has ended, that 
they’d buried it.
The Monitoring Commission for the Public Policies on 
Internal Displacement (MCPP) has proved these claims 
in the above-mentioned investigation on whether the gov-
ernment was complying with the demands from the 2004 
Constitutional Court ruling T-025. The MCPP report 
revealed that displaced persons who had tried to denounce 
their displacement as caused by paramilitaries were system-
atically rejected in the public centres for registration. Thus, 
the discourse on the non-existence of an armed conflict and 
the supposed abolishment of paramilitary groups is fur-
ther contributing to isolate the Colombian humanitarian 
catastrophe from its political and historical context. By por-
traying the armed groups as a sphere of society completely 
detached from state actions, the authorities urge for the sym-
pathy of the general public, arguing that they are all fighting 
a common enemy. This allows for the usurpation of land to 
continue and for private companies to continue establishing 
themselves in areas abandoned by the displaced, complicat-
ing efforts of preventing displacement and ensuring safe 
resettlement.
The Invisibility of the Displaced
In the above, we have argued that displacement in Colombia 
is systematically removed from its political context through 
a focus on humanitarian responsibilities rather than 
responsibilities for prevention and durable solutions, and 
through a representation of the conflict that allows only 
certain groups of displaced access to (some of) their rights. 
Whereas Ferguson’s analysis of how development aid func-
tions as a practice of depoliticizing the question of pov-
erty57 is very useful in this respect, Malkki’s work adds a 
crucial dimension by drawing attention to representational 
practices of the beneficiaries of aid as ahistorical, univer-
sal humanitarian subjects.58 She shows that, for the aid 
encounter to be a neutral, apolitical act, the power relations 
between aid giver and receiver must be rendered invisible. 
Depolitization through aid practices can only occur because 
simultaneously, the beneficiaries of aid are made invisible, 
being reduced to mute victims rather than historical actors. 
The aid receiver is depicted as someone in need, devoid of 
agency, who is connected to the aid giver only in humanness 
rather than through history or the current everyday power-
structured relationships between individuals and groups. 
Images of refugees and internally displaced people are com-
monly characterized by helplessness, suffering, and loss. 
This represents the displaced as a universal mass of victims, 
abstracted from the specific political and historical context 
which caused the displacement.59
In the case of Colombia, similarly, the displaced popula-
tion is made invisible. Whereas the Colombian media does 
report on the armed conflict continuously, this news hardly 
ever covers displacement and is far from nuanced. The space 
for critical journalism is highly limited in Colombia because 
firstly, ownership of mass media is concentrated in the 
hands of the political elite and secondly, Colombia is one of 
the most dangerous countries for investigative reporters.60 
Threats and assassinations by armed groups are most often 
met with impunity, which makes journalists use a high 
degree of self-censorship.61 As a consequence, displacement 
is rarely discussed within reporting on the armed conflict. A 
Human Rights expert who was interviewed indicates, “The 
displaced population is systematically made invisible. They 
are overshadowed by the personification of the kidnapped, 
the corpses of the ‘diputados,’ humanitarian agreements 
reached, etcetera (…).”62
According to this person, the invisibility of the displaced 
is not a coincidence but a deliberate strategy to remove public 
attention from the increasing problems related to displace-
ment. But according to many of the displaced themselves, 
the main reason for their invisibility is the fact that jour-
nalists are simply not interested in their predicament. Mr. 
Andrés Lozano, who is a displaced indigenous man settled 
in Bogotá, voices this concern when he comments on what 
he considers to be the mass media’s general lack of focus on 
and interest in the marginalized sections of the population:
Last week during the demonstrations for the hostages, five persons 
were killed in that same week just outside Bogotá, and no one said 
anything. In Colombia, you will not hear anything in the media 
about the displacement and the assassinations of campesinos and 
of the lower class.
As this statement suggests, among the displaced there is a 
deep-rooted skepticism towards the political elite, which 
is seen to include the media as well. As noted above, in 
Colombian society, there has been a huge gap between the 
urban elite and the rural population for centuries, a situa-
tion which continues until today. Most IDPs are considered 
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different culturally and are viewed as campesinos, or peas-
ants, who threaten the nature of urban culture.63 This his-
torically located gap is one of the explanations for the pro-
cesses and practices described here, while these at the same 
time work towards making the gap invisible.
In Conclusion
Colombia’s legislation on internal displacement is largely 
modelled on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, which were developed at the same time. It is 
amongst the most comprehensive laws to secure the rights 
of IDPs due to a combination of international pressure and 
input as well as a very strong national expertise. Yet, as we 
have illustrated in this article, the implementation of the 
law has been very limited, and main achievements have only 
been made in terms of short-term humanitarian assistance. 
On the one hand, one may argue that it is crucial for the 
Colombian state to assist its displaced population and that 
this assistance is vital in enabling survival of the displaced 
in the initial, most difficult, phase of their displacement. 
Furthermore, it is crucial that a comprehensive law is in 
place and there is some evidence that this is an instrument 
that the IDPs can increasingly use to improve their situa-
tion. The utilization by IDPs of the tutela, for example, has 
contributed to changes, as authorities are held accountable 
to their legal obligations under Law 387.
On the other hand, one may also argue that the systems 
that are currently available to assist IDPs in Colombia effect-
ively cover up the more structural problems underlying their 
displacement, which are thus left unaddressed both nation-
ally and internationally. In fact, the implementation of the 
Guiding Principles in national legislation, and partial com-
pliance with this law through the provision of humanitarian 
assistance of the displaced, may have prevented a public out-
cry on the situation in Colombia. The question is whether 
this is specific to the Colombian situation or whether it is 
common for states suffering from internal displacement to 
use the IDP category as a humanitarian category in order 
to avoid having to address the political issues underlying 
the displacement. While refugees who flee the country and 
cross a national border may obtain a legal status and protec-
tion under the Refugee Convention, this is not the case for 
IDPs because they are still under the jurisdiction of their 
own state.64 Thus, being an internally displaced person is 
not a legal status, and imposing the Guiding Principles on 
any state is impossible because of the salience of territorial 
sovereignty.
Some argue that the Guiding Principles have been cru-
cial in terms of recasting sovereignty as responsibility65 
or in highlighting the responsibility of the international 
community when states are unable or unwilling to address 
internal displacement.66 Critical voices on the other hand 
have argued that the Guiding Principles add nothing to 
the existing body of international human rights law, as the 
incorporated rights are already covered by legally binding 
treaties. IDPs should thus be treated as any other victim of 
human rights violations, making the IDP category redun-
dant.67 The analysis presented here of responses to dis-
placement in Colombia adds a concern to Hathaway’s. We 
argue that the partial implementation of IDP legislation in 
Colombia and the remaking of the IDP as a humanitarian 
category facilitates a focus away from human rights viola-
tions. It is hardly likely that the Colombian case is unique 
in this sense.
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